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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1807 the United States Congress passed legislation, which 
became effective on January 1, 1808, to end all importations of slaves 
into the United States.1  Even before that date, Congress had passed a 
series of laws that prevented Americans from participating in the trade 
as sailors, ship captains, ship owners, ship builders, or investors in slave 
trading ventures.2  The bicentennial of the closing of the trade to the 
United States provides an appropriate moment to examine how the 
United States withdrew from this form of commerce.   
At one level the tale is inspiring.  This was the first time in history 
that a slaveholding society voluntarily ceased to import new slaves.3  At 
another level, this is a cautionary, but nevertheless instructive, tale about 
how to use law to effectuate social change.  Starting in 1794, the United 
States Congress passed a series of laws aimed at preventing Americans 
from participating in the trade.4  After the 1807 law went into effect, the 
United States passed a handful of other laws to strengthen the ban and 
make it more effective.5  In short, Congress did not successfully end the 
trade on its first try, or its second or even its third; but building on each 
legislative attempt, Congress eventually closed the trade to all but the 
most intrepid smugglers.6 
Finally, an examination of the attempts to end the African Slave 
Trade may help policymakers and social activists deal with the modern 
problem of human trafficking.  Modern human trafficking is not the 
same as the African trade, despite the use of the term “slavery” by 
activists who campaign against trafficking.7  The often grotesque 
exploitation of people who have been trafficked in recent years is only 
 
 1. An Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves, ch.22, 2 Stat. 426 (1807). 
 2. Act of March 22, 1794, ch.11, 1 Stat. 347 (1794); Act of May 10, 1800, ch. 51, 2 Stat. 70 
(1800); Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 10, 2 Stat. 205 (1803). 
 3. Great Britain passed legislation to ban the trade a few weeks after the United States did 
and that law went into effect a few months before the American law.  An Act for the Abolition of 
the Slave Trade, 47 Geo III Sess. 1 c. 36.  However, while Britain was heavily involved in the 
African trade to other places, no slaves were being imported into the British Isles.  See James 
Walvin, Great Britain, African Slavery, in MACMILLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD SLAVERY, 176-
77 (Paul Finkelman & Joseph C. Miller eds., 1998).  
 4. Act of March 22, 1794, ch.11, 1 Stat. 347 (1794); Act of May 10, 1800, ch. 51, 2 Stat. 70 
(1800); Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 10, 2 Stat. 205 (1803). 
 5. See infra Part VI(B)-(C).  
 6. See infra Part V. 
 7. Nancy G. Abudu et al., Human Rights, 42 INT’L LAW. 755, 775 (2008) (quoting U.S. 
Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice: “[t]rafficking in persons is a modern-day form of slavery, a 
new type of global slave trade”). 
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superficially similar to slavery in the Americas in the 18th and 19th 
centuries.  Three critical differences between then and now stand out.   
First, the African slave trade was legal for more than 350 years in 
some Western countries, their American colonies, and the nations that 
emerged from those colonies.  The African slave trade was legal in what 
became the United States for nearly 200 years–from the 1620s when 
African slaves began to arrive in the Dutch and British colonies until 
1808 when the law banning the trade went into effect.  Today, human 
trafficking is illegal everywhere in the world.8  Similarly, the slave trade 
was legal in countries along the west coast of Africa, where most slaves 
were put on ships for the New World.  Thus, the local governments in 
Africa supported the trade, participated in it, sanctioned it, taxed it, and 
profited from it in many ways.  No modern nations sanction or support 
the trafficking of their own citizens or of non-citizens within their 
jurisdiction.   
Second, even after the African slave trade was banned, slavery 
itself was still legal in the United States, most of the British New World 
colonies,9 and in the Spanish colonies.  Thus, if someone could 
successfully smuggle a slave into the United States–either from Africa or 
the Caribbean–that slave could, to some extent, disappear into the 
existing slave population.  Trafficked persons are rarely held in legally 
sanctioned conditions upon arrival at their destination.  Similarly, a slave 
illegally brought to the US would have no reason to know or believe that 
he or she had a legal claim to freedom and could ask for protection from 
the government.  But, trafficked people are likely to know that they have 
a right to their freedom.  Put simply, slavery was legal in the United 
States, even after importations were not; but trafficking in people has 
never been legal and the exploitation of trafficked people is equally 
against the law.  
Finally, some people caught up in the web of modern trafficking 
voluntarily seek transportation to their destination, and may even be 
“willing victims” of trafficking because of their desperate desire to reach 
the United States, England, or some other western country.10  These 
 
 8. James C. Hathaway, The Human Rights Quagmire of “Human Trafficking”, 49 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 1 (2008); see also Jennifer S. Nam, The Case of The Missing Case: Examining The Civil 
Right of Action For Human Trafficking Victims, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1657 (2007). 
 9. England did not end slavery in its New World colonies until 1833.  See Howard 
Temperly, Emancipation Act, British (1833), in MACMILLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD SLAVERY, 
supra note 3, at 293.  Slavery remained legal in the United States until the ratification of the 
Thirteenth Amendment in 1865.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 10. Karen E. Bravo, Exploring the Analogy Between Modern Trafficking in Humans and the 
Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, 25 B.U. INT’L L. J. 207, 218 (2007).  
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“willing victims” of trafficking are similar to some indentured servants 
of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, who voluntarily agreed 
to a limited form of servitude in exchange for transportation to the 
American colonies, only to discover when they arrived that their new 
situation was horrendous and exploitative beyond anything they had 
expected.11  However, no one in Africa ever voluntarily agreed to be 
transported to the Americas as a slave, and all slaves came to America 
under the most horrifying of conditions–almost always in chains.12   
Yet, despite the many differences between the African slave trade 
and modern trafficking, those working to end trafficking may find both 
inspiration and tactical utility in examining how we came to abolish and 
suppress the African trade. 
II.  COLONIAL REGULATIONS OF THE SLAVE TRADE 
Before the American Revolution, both the colonies and Great 
Britain regulated the African slave trade to what later became the United 
States.  In fact, the British government gave special protection to the 
Royal African Company, which brought more slaves to the American 
colonies than any other single entity.13  Investors in the Royal African 
Company reached the highest echelons of British society, and included 
members of the Royal family.14  Even after the demise of the Royal 
African Company in 1750, the slave trade continued to be an important 
part of Britain’s mercantile policy.  Britain collected taxes on imported 
slaves while merchants in the metropolis made their fortunes.15   
In the colonies the slave trade was a source of labor, profits, and 
local tax revenues.  But for both economic and prudential reasons, 
colonial governments occasionally sought to limit importations.  In 
1698, for example, the South Carolina legislature concluded that “the 
great number of Negroes which of late have been imported into this 
 
 11. See ABBOTT EMERSON SMITH, COLONISTS IN BONDAGE: WHITE SERVITUDE AND 
CONVICT LABOR IN AMERICA 9-10, 253-54, 257, 259 (1947).  
 12. JOSEPH C. MILLER, WAY OF DEATH: MERCHANT CAPITALISM AND THE ANGOLAN SLAVE 
TRADE, 1730-1830, at 413 (1996) (describing the conditions aboard slave ships).  
 13. King Charles II and other royal family members invested in the Royal African Company 
(RAC). The investors not only provided the RAC with “the protection of royal privileges,” but also 
allowed the RAC to develop a monopoly on the early phase of the slave trade by providing the RAC 
with significant financing.  This monopoly effectively ended in 1698.  Joseph C. Miller, Royal 
African Company, in MACMILLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD SLAVERY, supra note 3, at 780-81. 
 14. Id.; HUGH THOMAS, THE SLAVE TRADE: THE HISTORY OF THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE, 
1440-1870, at 241 (1997).  DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 
131-32 (1966). 
 15. THOMAS, supra note 14; DAVIS, supra note 14.  
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Collony may endanger the safety thereof.”16  This law did not limit the 
trade, but rather, was designed to encourage the importation of white 
servants.17  It had virtually no impact on the growth of the black 
population, which by 1708 exceeded the white population.18   
Fearful of its growing black majority, in 1717 South Carolina 
imposed a tax of £40 per slave, virtually shutting down the trade,19 but 
two years later the legislature reduced the tax to £10 for every new slave 
brought from Africa,20 and the trade boomed.21  In 1740, in response to 
the Stono Rebellion of 1739, South Carolina passed a new tax law that 
was designed to end the trade in the near future.22  For the first fifteen 
months after the law was adopted, South Carolinians would continue to 
pay the £10 duty for every slave imported into the colony.23  Then, for a 
three-year period, the colony would impose a £100 tax on every adult 
slave imported from Africa, which would effectively end the trade.24  
The law recited the “very dangerous consequence to the peace and 
safety” of the colony from the “barbarous and savage disposition” of 
Africans.”25  Despite the “dangerous consequences” of importing new 
slaves, the legislature did not end importations immediately, possibly out 
of fear of unfairness to both slavers already on the way to South 
Carolina, and masters who desperately needed more slaves.  This fifteen-
month delay in implementing the £100 tax allowed for an orderly 
transition away from massive importations into the colony.  In any 
event, the law expired in 1744 and the colonists could once again import 
slaves without facing prohibitive duties.  In 1760, South Carolina 
attempted to ban the trade outright because the colonists feared the 
growing number of African-born slaves, but Royal authorities 
disallowed this law.26  In 1764 the colony levied a new tax of £100 per 
 
 16. Act of Oct. 8, 1698, ch. 197, 1698 S.C. Acts 153. 
 17. Id. 
 18. For statistics on the growth of the white and slave populations in colonial South Carolina 
see PETER WOOD, BLACK MAJORITY: NEGROES IN COLONIAL SOUTH CAROLINA FROM 1670 
THROUGH THE STONO REBELLION 131-66 (1974). 
 19. Act of Dec. 11, 1717, ch. 388, 1714 S.C. Acts 368-70; see also W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE 
SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1638-1870, at 
17 (1896), available at http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/webdubois/DuBoisSuppression 
Slavetrade6x9.pdf.  
 20. An Act for Laying an Imposition on Negroes, ch. 395, 3 S.C. Stat. 56-7 (1719). 
 21. See generally WOOD, supra note 18. 
 22. An Act for the Better Strengthening of this Province, ch.669, 1740 S.C. Acts 556-57. 
 23. Id. at 557. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 556.  
 26. DUBOIS, supra note 19, at 18. 
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head on imported slaves because, as the legislature noted, the growing 
number of African-born slaves “may prove of the most dangerous 
consequence.”27  However, as it had done in 1740, the legislature 
delayed the start of this duty, this time for just over sixteen months.28  
The law was only in force until 1767, but the trade was not resumed 
after that, presumably because of the growing tension between the 
colonies and Britain.29  This ended the trade there until after the 
Revolution, when South Carolina briefly resumed the trade.30 
The use of tax policy to limit the slave trade suggests that the South 
Carolinians wanted to avoid any moral issues that might have arisen 
with a debate over absolutely closing the trade.  In addition, by using an 
economic tool to regulate an economic activity, the South Carolina 
government enlisted the only bureaucracy available—the tax collectors 
and regulators of the colony’s ports—to limit the trade.  The tax policy 
may also have made enforcement easier because juries or judges 
sympathetic to slavery might have been unwilling to convict someone on 
criminal charges for illegal importation, but enforcement of tax laws 
would have been seen as “neutral” on slavery.31  
Shortly before the Revolution, Virginia also tried to curtail or ban 
the trade, not for prudential reasons but mostly to prevent the outflow of 
capital from the colony, although the law also had the benefit of raising 
the value of slaves already in the colony.32  In 1769 Virginia raised the 
tax on slaves,33 which led to more than seventy petitions from Liverpool 
and Lancaster merchants, who argued that the new tax law was to raise 
the value of those slaves already in the colony as well as those who 
would be born in the future.34  This was a classic case of “self-dealing” 
because the Virginia lawmakers were also the largest slave-owners in the 
 
 27. Act of August 25, 1764, ch. 933, 1764 S.C. Acts 187-88.   
 28. Id. 
 29. DUBOIS, supra note 19, at 19.  
 30. Act of March 28, 1787, ch. 7, 1787 S.C. Acts. 430, reprinted in DuBois, supra note 19, at 
229 app. A; Act of Dec. 17, 1803, ch. 7, 1803 S.C. Acts 449, reprinted in DUBOIS, supra note 19, at 
240 app. B; DUBOIS, supra note 19, at 19; see generally Jed H. Shugerman, The Louisiana 
Purchase and South Carolina’s Reopening of the Slave Trade in 1803, 22 J. OF THE EARLY 
REPUBLIC 263 (2002).  
 31. There may be a lesson here for modern trafficking issues – that the tax structure and the 
pursuit of unpaid taxes on illegal earnings might be a useful way to fight trafficking because it 
would avoid many criminal “proof” issues while still getting at the traffickers. 
 32. Richard K. MacMaster, Arthur Lee’s “Address on Slavery”: An Aspect of Virginia’s 
Struggle to End the Slave Trade, 1765-1774, 80 THE VA. MAG. OF HIST. AND BIOGRAPHY 141, 148-
49 (1972). 
 33. Act of June 1, 1770, ch. 7, 1770 Va. Acts 336. 
 34. MacMaster, supra note 32, at 148.   
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colony.35  The Crown overruled this law, declaring it would not “approve 
so high a duty on the importation of a considerable article of British 
Commerce.”36   
In 1772 Virginia passed yet another law, this time taxing slaves at a 
prohibitive level.37  This statute was accompanied by a petition from the 
Virginia legislature to the King arguing that “[t]he importation of slaves 
into the colonies from the coast of Africa, hath long been considered as a 
trade of great inhumanity, and under its present encouragement, we have 
too much reason to fear [it] will endanger the very existence of your 
majesty’s American dominions.”38  Thus, the Virginia legislators asked 
the King to “remove all those restraints on your majesty’s governors of 
this colony, which inhibit their assenting to such laws as might check so 
very pernicious a commerce.”39 
The Royal Governor, Lord Dunmore, in fact signed this bill, 
believing it was in his power to do so.  He urged the home government 
to allow it, arguing in favor of the law, not on economic or humanitarian 
grounds, but on public policy and prudential grounds.  He noted that the 
majority of whites in the colony were  
very anxious for an Act to lay an additional duty upon the importation 
of Slaves, in order to restrain the introduction of people, the Number of 
whom, already in the Colony, gives them Just cause to apprehend the 
most dangerous Consequence there from, and therefore makes it 
necessary that they should fall upon means, not only of preventing 
their increase, but, also of lessening their number, and the interest of 
the Country would Manifestly require the total expulsion of them.40 
The slave trade was vital to the British economy and the slave 
trading interests had powerful patrons in the government.  Thus, it is 
perhaps not surprising that the Royal Government overruled Governor 
 
 35. Id.  In many ways these laws and the British response prefigured American commerce 
clause jurisprudence, where the Supreme Court strikes down state laws that favor in-state producers 
or businesses.  See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 2 (1824) (striking down a New York law that 
forbade out-of-state competitors from landing passenger ships in New York state); see also, 
Houston, E. & W.T.R. Co. v. U.S., 234 U.S. 342, 360 (1914) (striking down discriminatory freight 
rates that favored in-state shippers); see also, Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 465-66 (2005) 
(striking down laws favoring in-state wine producers over out-of-state producers).  
 36. MacMaster, supra note 32, at 149. 
 37. Act of Feb. 1777, ch. 22, 1777 Va. Acts 530.  
 38. The petition is quoted at length in ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 
51-52 (1803). 
 39. Id.  
 40. Darold D. Wax, Negro Import Duties in Colonial Virginia: A Study of British Commercial 
Policy and Local Public Policy, 79 VA. MAG. OF HIST. AND BIOGRAPHY 29, 42 (1971) (quoting 
Lord Dunmore speaking to Lord Hillsborough, May 1, 1772). 
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Dunmore and voided the statute. 41  In his Summary View of the Rights of 
British America (1774), Thomas Jefferson asserted, somewhat 
disingenuously, that Virginians favored the “abolition of domestic slavery” 
and that as the first step towards this end “it is necessary to exclude all 
further importations from Africa.”42  He complained, however, that “our 
repeated attempts to effect this . . . by imposing duties which might amount 
to a prohibition, have been hitherto defeated by his majesty’s negative.”43  
There is, in fact, no evidence that any substantial number of white 
Virginians opposed slavery at this time.44  In his first draft of the 
Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson condemned the Crown 
in more forceful language, asserting that the King had “waged cruel war 
against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and 
liberty,” by perpetuating the African slave trade.45  Calling the African 
trade “piratical warfare,” Jefferson asserted that “the CHRISTIAN king 
of Great Britain” was so “determin[ed] to keep open a market where 
MEN” were bought and sold that he used his “negative” to suppress 
“every legislative attempt to prohibit or to restrain this execrable 
commerce.”46 
The Continental Congress removed Jefferson’s tirade from the draft 
of the Declaration, in part because it simply did not ring true.47  The 
colonists, for the most part, had been willing and eager purchasers of 
slaves, as the rapid growth of the slave population showed.  Nor is there 
any evidence that either Jefferson or any of the other leaders of Virginia 
had any interest in actually ending slavery.48  Virginia’s attempt to ban 
the trade was mostly economic and prudential, and not based on any 
moral opposition to slavery per se.  Similarly, the Crown’s refusal to 
allow Virginia to limit or end the trade was economic. 
 
 41. Earl John Murray Dunmore, Governor of Virginia, A Proclamation for publishing the 
ratification of three acts of the Assembly, and the repeal of three other acts (24 June 1773), in 6 
EXECUTIVE JOURNALS OF THE COUNCIL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 651-52 (Benjamin J. Hillman ed., 
1966).  For a discussion of this source see Wax, supra note 40, at 42-44.  
 42. Thomas Jefferson, Summary View of the Rights of British America, in THE FOUNDER’S 
CONSTITUTION Ch. 14, Doc. 10 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987), available at 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch14s10.html.  
 43. Id. 
 44. See generally PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN 
THE AGE OF JEFFERSON (2001).   
 45. See Jefferson’s “original Rough draught” of the Declaration of Independence, reprinted in 
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 423-27 (Julian Boyd ed., 1950). 
 46. Jefferson’s “Original Rough draught” of the Declaration of Independence, supra note 45. 
 47. FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 140.  
 48. Id.   
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During the Revolution all of the new states banned or suspended 
the trade.  In 1774, Virginia’s emerging revolutionary government 
banned the trade as part of general non-importation resolutions49 and in 
1778 the legislature formally banned the trade.50  Most slaves came on 
English ships, and even those on American ships were usually purchased 
from agents of the English traders stationed on the west coast of Africa.  
Thus, a ban on the trade was part of the general non-importation 
movement at the beginning of the Revolution. 
In some of the northern colonies abolition of the trade had a moral 
as well as an economic basis.51  Opposition to slavery was growing, and 
during or immediately after the Revolution, five states would either end 
slavery outright (Massachusetts and New Hampshire) or pass gradual 
abolition acts (Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Connecticut) that would 
lead to a relatively speedy end to slavery.52  In those states, a ban on the 
trade was consistent with growing opposition to slavery itself.   
In the remaining new states, where slavery was central to the 
economy, opposition to the trade was economic and political, but not 
essentially moral.  After the Revolution, South Carolina reopened the 
trade, but then suspended it in 1787 because of an on-going depression 
in the state.53  Similarly, North Carolina levied a prohibitive tax on 
imported slaves and then in 1794 banned the trade altogether.54  The 
trade remained open in Georgia in 1787, but in the wake of the Haitian 
Revolution, that state would also ban the trade.55  Thus, in 1787, when 
the Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia, only Georgia and 
North Carolina allowed the importation of slaves. 
 
 49. MacMaster, supra note 32, at 152. 
 50. Act of Oct. 5, 1778, ch. 1, 1778 Va. Acts 471. 
 51. ARTHUR ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN THE NORTH 
117, 201-08 (1967); DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 
262-64 (1972); DONALD ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS, 1765-
1820, at 295, 299 (1967); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1765-1848, at 42-51 (1978); see generally PAUL 
FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY: FEDERALISM, AND COMITY (1981).   
 52. ZILVERSMIT, supra note 51, at 201-08; DAVIS, supra note 51; ROBINSON, supra note 51; 
WIECEK, supra note 51; FINKELMAN, supra note 51.   
 53. Act of March 28, 1787, ch. 7, 1787 S.C. Acts. 430; Shugerman, supra note 30. 
 54. An Act Against West Indian Slaves, ch. 1, 1795 N.C. Sess. Laws 786, reprinted in 
DUBOIS, supra note 19, at 237 app. B.  
 55. Act of Dec. 19, 1793, 1793 Ga. Laws 442, in MARBURY & CRAWFORD, DIGEST 442, 
reprinted in DUBOIS, supra note 19, at 236 app. B.   
9
Finkelman: The American Suppression of the African Slave Trade
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
9-FINKELMAN.DOC 4/10/2009  9:03 AM 
440 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:431 
The Revolution brought freedom to slaves who joined the armies 
on both sides or escaped in the chaos of war.56  Thousands of slaves left 
South Carolina and Georgia when the British Army evacuated those 
states.57  Some of these people remained free, while others ended up as 
slaves in the British Caribbean.58  At the end of the war, leaders in the 
Deep South fully expected to reopen the trade at some point to replenish 
their slaves, and thus at the Constitutional Convention they fought for 
continuing the slave trade.   
In 1787, when the Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia, 
there were virtually no slaves being imported into the nation, as only 
Georgia and North Carolina technically still allowed the African trade.  
But with the expectation of reopening the trade in the near future, the 
delegates from the Carolinas and Georgia jealously guarded their right to 
import slaves.59  Thus, Charles Pinckney told the Convention that South 
Carolina would “never receive the plan if it prohibits the slave trade.”60  
His older cousin, General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, explained why 
this was so, declaring “S[outh] Carolina and Georgia cannot do without 
slaves.”61   
III.  THE SLAVE TRADE AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
A major reason for calling the Philadelphia Convention was to give 
the new national government the power to regulate international and 
domestic commerce.62  All of the delegates understood that the national 
government had to have some power over international and domestic 
commerce, but the delegates disagreed on the scope of that power.63  
Most northern delegates favored a strong national commerce power that 
would stimulate foreign trade, help defend domestic commercial markets 
from foreign competition, and help protect the northern maritime 
 
 56. BENJAMIN QUARLES, THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 51-67 (1961); 
GRAHAM HODGES, THE BLACK LOYALIST DIRECTORY: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN EXILE IN THE AGE 
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION xi-xxi (1996). 
 57. HODGES, supra note 56; SYLVIA FREY, WATER FROM THE ROCK: BLACK RESISTANCE IN A 
REVOLUTIONARY AGE 81-85, 108-109 (1991). 
 58. HODGES, supra note 56; JOHN W. PULIS, MOVING ON: BLACK LOYALISTS IN THE AFRO-
ATLANTIC WORLD xv (1999). 
 59. ROBINSON, supra note 51, at 295-99.   
 60. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 364 (Max Farrand ed., 1966). 
 61. Id. at 371; FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 28. 
 62. MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 91 (2002); see also FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 10. 
 63. FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 22-32.  
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industry.64  Southern delegates feared that this power would be used to 
adversely affect their states, which produced raw materials for export, 
were dependent on imports, and had no local shipping industry.65    
Slavery was at the heart of these southern fears because the South’s 
economy was based on agricultural products produced by slaves.  
Southern delegates at the convention envisioned an aggressive 
commercial North that would undermine their economy though export 
taxes and other commercial regulations.  While there was no significant 
antislavery movement in the North at this time, Southern delegates 
feared the North would soon turn on their institution, using tax and 
commerce powers to attack slavery.  No northerners at the convention  
even suggested that the national government should be able to regulate 
slavery or touch slavery in the states.  But some southerners feared this 
would happen in a stronger national government.  Thus, in one debate, 
South Carolina’s Pierce Butler blurted out: “[t]he security the South[ern] 
States want is that their negroes may not be taken from them which 
some gentlemen within or without doors, have a very good mind to 
do.”66 
In addition to fearing that taxation or commercial regulation might 
indirectly harm slavery, delegates from the Carolinas and Georgia also 
feared that if the new Congress could regulate commerce it would 
immediately ban the African slave trade.  No northerner ever raised this 
issue.  But, at the Convention, the delegates from South Carolina raised 
it on their own, when the Convention debated the powers of Congress 
over what the delegates called “navigation acts,” and what is today 
known as the commerce power.67  Their fear was quite simple: if 
Congress had plenary power to regulate international commerce, they 
assumed that a majority of Congress would immediately vote to close 
the African slave trade.68   
In the wake of the Revolution, opposition to the trade was strong 
for a variety of reasons.  Some Americans found slavery deeply immoral 
and a fundamental violation of the principles of the Revolution.69  By the 
time of the Convention, Pennsylvania and all the New England states 
had either ended slavery outright or were in the process of ending 
 
 64. Id.   
 65. Id. 
 66. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 605. 
 67. FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 30-31. 
 68. Id. at 31-32. 
 69. THOMAS, supra note 14, at 479-80; see generally DAVIS, supra note 51.  
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slavery through gradual abolition acts.70  Southerners presumed these 
states would also oppose a continuation of the trade.  In addition, the 
South Carolinians feared that other slave states, like New York, New 
Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia, would support a ban on the trade.71  
These fears were not unreasonable, because many Americans made a 
distinction between slavery and the trade.72  
Some Americans who were comfortable with, or at least resigned 
to, the continuation of slavery, nevertheless believed that the African 
trade was particularly immoral and pernicious.73  Many people who 
could justify—or at least rationalize—holding people in bondage, who 
were born to that condition, saw no good reason for bringing more 
slaves to the nation.  Other Americans, particularly southerners, who had 
no strong moral feelings about the trade, or even slavery, nevertheless 
believed that slavery was an inherent threat to the society, and 
continuing to import African slaves would only exacerbate an already 
dangerous situation.  Having just fought a revolution for their own 
liberty, many Americans worried that slaves might soon follow the 
model of their masters.  Finally, many slave owners in Virginia and 
Maryland opposed the African trade for narrowly economic reasons: 
they had more slaves than they needed, and knew that if the trade ended 
their surplus slaves would become more valuable.74   
At the Constitutional Convention, the delegates from South 
Carolina, supported by other Southerners, insisted on explicit protection 
for the African trade in the Constitution.75  The debates over this issue 
were among the most intense in the Convention.  While these debates 
were not part of the debate over slave representation that led to the 
Three-Fifths Clause, they were influenced by that clause.76  Once the 
Convention agreed to count slaves for purposes of representation in 
Congress, the status of the trade became more important.  A continuation 
 
 70. FINKELMAN, supra note 51, at 41-45; ZILVERSMIT, supra note 51. 
 71. FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 17, 32. 
 72. See id. at 31-32. 
 73. Id. at 23-24; see 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, 
at 370 (reproducing speech by George Mason attacking the slave trade); see also Peter Wallenstein, 
Flawed Keepers of the Flame: The Interpreters of George Mason, 102 VA. MAG. OF HIST. AND 
BIOGRAPHY 229-60 (1994); see also DUBOIS, supra note 19, at 39-40. 
 74. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 371.  For 
example, in the 1780s and 1790s Thomas Jefferson sold more than 80 slaves to raise money to pay 
his debts and buy the many things he imported from France.  See FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at ch. 
6-7. 
 75. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 210, 364-65, 
370, 373.  
 76. Id. at 106, 215-25, 369-75. 
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of the trade would not only lead to an increase of slaves and human 
misery in the new nation, but it would also strengthen the South in 
Congress, giving more political power to the supporters of bondage.  
This prospect led Gouverneur Morris, who represented Pennsylvania at 
the Convention, to denounce the immorality of political compromises 
over slavery:  
The admission of slaves into the Representation when fairly explained 
comes to this: that the inhabitant of Georgia and S. C. who goes to the 
Coast of Africa, and in defiance of the most sacred laws of humanity 
tears away his fellow creatures from their dearest connections & 
dam(n)s them to the most cruel bondages, shall have more votes in a 
Govt. instituted for protection of the rights of mankind, than the 
Citizen of Pa or N. Jersey who views with a laudable horror, so 
nefarious a practice.77 
Despite the attempts of Morris and a few others to raise the moral 
question of slavery, most of the delegates focused on compromise and 
economic necessity.78  In August, the Convention debated the Commerce 
Clause, which would give Congress the power to regulate international 
and interstate commerce by a simple majority.79  Before that debate 
could take place, the South Carolina delegation insisted on protection for 
the African slave trade and a ban on export taxes.80  Southerners 
believed that export taxes could be used to tax the commodities 
produced by slave labor, such as tobacco and rice, and thus indirectly 
harm slavery.81  South Carolina’s John Rutledge noted that he would 
vote for the Commerce Clause as it stood, but only “on [the] condition 
that the subsequent part relating to negroes should also be agreed to.”82  
Delegates from Connecticut and Massachusetts indicated some support 
for Rutledge’s position.  What should be called the “dirty compromise” 
of the Convention was taking shape.83  The South Carolina delegation 
would support the Commerce Clause if New England would support a 
 
 77. Id. at 222. 
 78. Id. at 210-13, 221, 253-54, 334, 355-56; 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
OF 1787, supra note 66, at 637, 640. 
 79. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 305, 356.  
 80. Id. at 305-06.  
 81. Id. at 360. 
 82. Id. at 306; see also Paul Finkelman, Garrison’s Constitution: The Covenant with Death 
and How It Was Made, Part 2, 32 PROLOGUE (Winter 2000) available at 
http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2000/winter/garrisons-constitution-2.html; 
FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 25. 
 83. FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 25. 
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prohibition on export taxes and a protection for the slave trade.84  This 
understanding solidified in late August. 
On August 21, the New England states joined the five slave states 
south of Delaware on three crucial votes.85  On the first vote, all three 
New England states voted to defeat an amendment to the draft 
Constitution that would have allowed Congress, by a simple majority 
vote, to tax exports in order to raise money to support the national 
government.86  During the debate over this motion Connecticut’s Oliver 
Ellsworth—a future Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court—
argued against taxing exports because such taxes would unfairly hurt the 
South which produced major export crops such as “[t]obo. rice and 
indigo.”87  Ellsworth believed “a tax on these alone would be partial and 
unjust.”88  Next, in a key five-to-six vote, Connecticut joined the five 
slave states to defeat a proposal, made by James Madison, to allow taxes 
on exports by a two-thirds vote of Congress.89  On the final vote, to 
absolutely ban all export taxes, Massachusetts joined Connecticut and 
the southern states in voting to prohibit export taxes, passing the 
measure seven-to-four.90  During the debate, the Virginia delegation was 
divided, three-to-two, with James Madison and George Washington 
unsuccessfully favoring Congressional power to tax exports.91 
The Convention then debated a motion by Luther Martin to allow a 
tax on imported slaves.92  Martin represented Maryland, a slave state, but 
one with a surplus of slaves, a fact that helps explain his opposition to 
the African trade.  Rutledge opposed Martin’s motion with a two-
pronged attack.  He first told the Convention that the “true question at 
present is whether the Southn. States shall or shall not be parties to the 
Union.”93  The implied threat of secession was clear.  He then told the 
northern delegates that, if they would “consult their interest,” they would 
“not oppose the increase of Slaves which will increase the commodities 
of which they will become the carriers.”94  Ellsworth of Connecticut 
 
 84. Id.   
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. 
 87. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 360. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 363. 
 90. Id. at 363-64. 
 91. Id.; Finkelman, supra note 82 (citing STAUGHTON LYND, The Abolitionist Critique of the 
Constitution, in CLASS CONFLICT, SLAVERY, AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: TEN ESSAYS 
159-60 (1967)); FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 26. 
 92. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 364.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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agreed, refusing to debate the “morality or wisdom of slavery,” instead 
simply asserting, “[w]hat enriches a part enriches the whole.”95  The 
alliance for profit between the Deep South and New England was now 
fully developed.96  It is important to understand that this was not an 
alliance stimulated by New England’s involvement in the African slave 
trade itself.  By 1787, all of the New England states had banned the trade 
and prohibited their citizens from participating in it.97  The alliance was 
over trade and commerce that would involve the products of slave labor, 
and not the bodies of slaves themselves. 
Despite the support from Connecticut, Charles Pinckney reaffirmed 
that South Carolina would “never receive the plan if it prohibits the slave 
trade.”98  In a rhetorical slight-of-hand that none of the other delegates 
challenged, Pinckney equated taxing the African trade with a prohibition 
on the trade itself.  This was part of the South Carolinians’ apparent 
tactic of constantly exaggerating any threat to slavery combined with 
persistent blustering threats to oppose the Constitution if they did not get 
their way on slavery-related issues. 
The next day Roger Sherman, also of Connecticut, declared his 
personal disapproval of slavery but refused to condemn it in other parts 
of the nation.  He opposed any prohibition of the trade, asserting that 
“the public good did not require” an end to the trade.99  This was an odd 
argument to make, since no one at the Convention had ever suggested 
the Constitution ought to prohibit the trade.  In this debate, Sherman 
apparently accepted the hyperbole of the South Carolina delegation that 
even a tax on the trade was the equivalent to an outright ban.  Sherman 
also implicitly accepted the arguments coming from the Deep South that 
anything short of an explicit protection of the trade was the same thing 
as ban.  Sherman noted that the states currently had the right to import 
slaves, and he opposed tampering with this right because “it was 
expedient to have as few objections as possible” to the new 
Constitution.100  Here Sherman assumed it was necessary to defuse 
southern opposition to the Constitution, which might result from a ban 
on the slave trade, but he did not think it necessary to placate those in the 
North–even in his own state–who might oppose the Constitution if it 
allowed the slave trade to continue.  Indeed, Sherman was prepared to 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 12, 28. 
 98. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 364. 
 99. Id. at 369.  
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appease those who supported the slave trade, but he apparently was 
unconcerned about the strong opposition to the slave trade in his own 
region.   
Next, Sherman observed that “the abolition of slavery seemed to be 
going on in the U.S.”101  He argued that if the Convention and the 
national government did nothing about the slave trade, the “good sense 
of the several States” would soon put an end to all slavery in the 
country.102  In making this argument, Sherman either confused the 
abolition of the slave trade with the abolition of slavery itself, or he 
foolishly believed that because New England and Pennsylvania had 
begun to abolish slavery, the rest of the nation would soon follow.103  
Finally, revealing his priorities, Sherman urged the delegates to hurry 
and finish their business noting, no doubt, that they had been in session 
for almost three months.104  
George Mason of Virginia responded to Sherman with a fierce 
attack on the “infernal traffic” in slaves, which he blamed on “the 
avarice of British Merchants.”105  Reflecting the sectional hostilities at 
the Convention, as well as trying to lay blame on anyone but Virginians 
for the existence of slavery, Mason then “lamented” that his “[e]astern 
brethren had from a lust of gain embarked in this nefarious traffic.”106  
Mason leveled some of the strongest criticism of slavery yet heard at the 
Convention, declaring it an “evil” system which produced “the most 
pernicious effect on manners.”107  He declared that “every master of 
slaves is born a petty tyrant” and warned that slavery would “bring the 
judgment of heaven on a Country” and ultimately produce “national 
calamities.”108  Despite this apparent attack on the whole institution, 
Mason ended his speech by demanding only that the national 
government “have power to prevent the increase of slavery” by 
prohibiting the African trade.109  As historian Peter Wallenstein has 
argued, “[w]hatever his occasional rhetoric, George Mason was—if one 
must choose—proslavery, not antislavery.  He acted on behalf of 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 370. 
 103. FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 26-27. 
 104. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 370; see also 
FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 27. 
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 106. Id. at 370; see also FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 27. 
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FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 27. 
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Virginia slaveholders, not Virginia slaves,” when he opposed a 
continuation of the African trade.110  
Others at the Convention understood this quite well.  Mason failed 
to say that Virginia, like Maryland, had a surplus of slaves and did not 
need the African slave trade any longer.  But James McHenry candidly 
wrote in his private notes: “[t]hat the population or increase of slaves in 
Virginia exceeded their calls for their services,” and thus a prohibition of 
the slave trade “would be a monopoly” in Virginia’s “favor.”111  Under 
such conditions “Virginia etc would make their own terms for such 
[slaves] as they might sell.”112  The “etc” no doubt included McHenry’s 
own state of Maryland.113 
Ellsworth of Connecticut, adopting the same pose as Sherman, 
answered Mason.  Because “he had never owned a slave,” Ellsworth 
declared he “could not judge of the effects of slavery on character.”114  
But if slavery were as wrong as Mason had suggested, then logically, 
merely ending the trade was insufficient.  But of course Ellsworth knew 
that the Virginians like Mason were not suggesting that the national 
government abolish slavery.115  Therefore, since there were many slaves 
in Virginia and Maryland and fewer in the Deep South, Ellsworth argued 
that any prohibition on the trade would be “be unjust towards S. 
Carolina & Georgia.”116  So Ellsworth urged the Convention not to 
“intermeddle” in the affairs of other states.117   
The Convention had now witnessed the bizarre phenomenon of a 
New Englander defending the slave trade against the attacks of a 
Virginian.  Once again, it is important to understand that in this debate, 
no one ever suggested that the Constitution interfere with slavery in the 
states or that it ban the trade.  The South Carolinians had successfully 
altered the debate to one over a ban on the slave trade, which ignored the 
fact that no one had suggested such a ban. In doing this, they were able 
to get New Englanders to defend their right to import slaves, thus setting 
the stage for an affirmative protection for the trade. 
The Carolinians were of course quite capable of defending their 
own institution.  Charles Pinckney, citing ancient Rome and Greece, 
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declared that slavery was “justified by the example of all the world.”118  
He warned that any prohibition of the slave trade would “produce 
serious objections to the Constitution which he wished to see 
adopted.”119  His older and more famous cousin, General Charles 
Cotesworth Pinckney, also declared his support for the Constitution, but 
noted that his “personal influence . . . would be of no avail towards 
obtaining the assent” of his home state.120  He believed Virginia’s 
opposition to the trade was more pecuniary than moral.  Virginia would 
“gain by stopping the importations” because “her slaves will rise in 
value, and she has more than she wants.”121  Prohibiting the trade would 
force South Carolina and Georgia “to confederate” on “unequal 
terms.”122  While Virginia might gain from the closing of the slave trade, 
Pinckney implied that the nation as a whole would not benefit from 
closing the trade.  Pinckney argued that more slaves would produce 
more goods, and that result would help not only the South but also the 
North, where the states involved in “the carrying trade.”123  Furthermore, 
he declared, “[t]he more consumption also, and the more of this, the 
more of revenue for the common treasury.”124  Pinckney saw the slave 
trade solely as an economic issue, and therefore, thought it “reasonable” 
that imported slaves be taxed.125  But a prohibition of the slave trade 
would be “an exclusion of S. Carolina from the Union.”126  As he had 
made clear at the beginning of his speech, “S. Carolina and Georgia 
cannot do without slaves.”127  Rutledge and Butler added similar 
sentiments, as did Abraham Baldwin of Georgia and Williamson of 
North Carolina.128 
New England twangs now supported the Southern drawls.  Elbridge 
Gerry of Massachusetts offered some conciliatory remarks, and 
Sherman, ever the ally of the South, declared that “it was better to let the 
[Southern] States import slaves than to part with them, if they made that 
a sine qua non.”129  But in what may have been an attempt to give his 
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remarks an antislavery tone, he argued that taxing imported slaves was 
morally wrong, because that “implied they were property.”130  This 
position undoubtedly pleased Sherman’s southern allies, who did not 
want to pay taxes on any slaves they imported.  Sherman’s speech also 
underscored the profound support that the Carolinians and Georgians 
found among some New Englanders.131  
Similarly, Rufus King of Massachusetts argued that “the subject 
should be considered in a political light only,”132 implying that the moral 
questions should be ignored.  He disagreed with Sherman on the taxation 
issue, however, arguing that an “exemption of slaves from duty whilst 
every other import was subjected to it, was an inequality that could not 
fail to strike the commercial sagacity of the Northn. & middle States.”133    
These arguments illustrate the reasons for cooperation between 
New England and the Deep South on this issue.  New Englanders, 
involved in the “carrying trade,” would profit from transporting rice and 
other products produced by slave labor.134  And the South Carolinians 
seemed willing to support the New Englanders’ demands for 
Congressional power to regulate all commerce.  In return, New 
Englanders would support the right of the Carolinas and Georgia to 
import the slaves they could not “do without.”135  
On the other side of the issue, John Dickinson of Delaware 
vigorously opposed allowing the slave trade to continue.  Dickinson 
argued that the trade was “inadmissible on every principle of honor and 
safety.”136  Furthermore, he was prepared to call the Carolinians’ bluff 
on the question of whether they would actually join the stronger Union 
under the new Constitution.  Dickinson declared he “could not believe 
that the Southn. States would refuse to confederate”137 over this issue, 
especially because Dickinson did not believe that the power to end trade 
would be “immediately exercised by the Genl. Government.”138  James 
Wilson was also skeptical of southern threats, asserting that South 
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Carolina and Georgia would “never refuse to Unite because the 
importation might be prohibited,” since he expected these states would 
end the trade on their own.139   
The most surprising contribution to this debate came from 
Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, who had previously been the most 
consistent opponent of slavery at the Convention.140  He suggested that 
the subject of commercial regulation acts and the slave trade be sent to 
committee, because “[t]hese things may form a bargain among the 
Northern and Southern States.”141  The Convention quickly accepted his 
suggestion.142  
On August 25, the Convention considered a proposal that Congress 
be barred from prohibiting the African slave trade until 1800, but that in 
the meantime a reasonable tax could be levied on imported slaves. 143  
South Carolina’s General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney immediately 
urged that the date be changed to 1808, which would be twenty years 
after the Constitution was ratified.144  Nathaniel Gorham of 
Massachusetts seconded this motion.145  James Madison, who owned 
slaves but abhorred the slave trade, complained that this provision was 
“dishonorable to the National character” and to the Constitution and that 
“twenty years will produce all the mischief that can be apprehended 
from the liberty to import slaves.”146  Nevertheless, the delegates 
accepted Pinckney’s change by a seven-to-four vote.147  Three New 
England states, Maryland, and the three Deep South states supported 
Pinckney’s motion.148 
Gouverneur Morris, still resisting a continuation of the slave trade, 
then proposed that the clause specifically declare that the “importation of 
slaves” be limited to the Carolinas and Georgia.149  Morris wanted it 
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 145. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 415.  
 146. Id.  On Madison, see generally RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 
(1990).  
 147. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 415.  
 148. Id.; FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 29 
 149. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 415; 
FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 29.  
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known “that this part of the Constitution was a compliance with those 
States.”150  Having made this motion only to embarrass supporters of the 
trade, Morris withdrew it.151  By a seven-to-four vote the Convention 
then adopted the slave trade provision.152  The three New England states 
once again joined Maryland and the Deep South to allow the slave trade 
to continue for twenty years.153  This vote formed a key component of 
the “dirty compromise.”154 
IV.  UNDERSTANDING THE SLAVE TRADE CLAUSE 
The final slave trade clause read:   
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the State now 
existing shall think proper to admit shall not be prohibited by the 
Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a 
Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten 
dollars for each Person.155   
The clause did not mention slaves or the trade, but everyone at the 
Convention knew that was what it was about.  The wording of the clause 
was clearly designed to obfuscate what the Convention had done, and 
the Connecticut delegation was instrumental in this result.156  This, 
however, did not fool anyone.  Thus, an anonymous author in 
Connecticut asked: “why this sentence should be couched in this blind 
mysterious form of words, unless to avoid using the word Negroes, I 
must leave to those that drew it to explain.”157  He concluded that “the 
seeming case taken to cover the true intent of this” clause was a 
sufficient reason to oppose the entire Constitution.158  Similarly, in 
campaigning against the Constitution, the Connecticut politician 
 
 150. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 415.  
 151. Id. at 416. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id.  
 154. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 44, at 29. 
 155. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 1. 
 156. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 415; Paul 
Finkelman, The Founders and Slavery: Little Ventured, Little Gained, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 413, 
425-26 (2001).  
 157. Letter from Massachusetts, CONNECTICUT JOURNAL, Oct. 24, 1787, in 3 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 378-79 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978) 
[hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION].   
 158. Id. 
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Benjamin Gale attacked the “artful language they use to cover their 
meaning” in the slave trade provision.159  He asked:  
Why all this sly cunning and artful mode of expression unless to cover 
from your observation and notice that Negroes was intended by the 
word persons . . . lest it should frighten people who may have some 
tender feelings and a just sense of the rights of human nature.160 
It is important to understand that the clause did not require an end 
to the trade in 1808.  It only prevented Congress from ending the trade 
before 1808.  Moreover, when the Convention accepted this clause 
almost all the delegates assumed that the Deep South and the Southwest 
would grow faster than the rest of the nation.161  The delegates assumed 
that what is now Alabama and Mississippi would become new states, 
and that South Carolina and especially Georgia would have much larger 
populations.162  If these assumptions had been correct, then by 1808 the 
states that most wanted to continue the trade would have had enough 
political power, and enough allies, to prevent an end to the trade.  
Ending the trade would require that a bill pass both houses of Congress 
and be signed by the president.  That process would give the supporters 
of the trade three opportunities to stop a bill, and keep the trade open.  
Thus, the slave trade debate was seen in the Deep South as a major 
victory.  South Carolina and Georgia had bought two decades to gain the 
strength to preserve the trade forever. 
V.  THE SLAVE TRADE AND RATIFICATION 
The slave trade provision was a significant factor in the debates 
over ratification, but its impact was complicated.  Opponents of the 
Constitution, in both the North and the South, roundly condemned the 
clause.  On the other hand, supporters of the Constitution—even those 
who were ambivalent or hostile to slavery—praised the clause, although 
for very different reasons. 
 
 159. Benjamin Gale, Address at the Constitutional Convention (Nov. 12, 1787), in 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 157, at 424. 
 160. Id. at 425. 
 161. FINKELMAN, supra note 44.  See, e.g., Benjamin Gale, Address at the constitutional 
convention (Nov. 12, 1787), in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 157, at 
423, 429 n.7 (predicting the South would dominate Congress in the future). 
 162. This was made clear in the discussion over the allocation of members of Congress before 
there was a census.  See FINKELMAN, supra note 44.  
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A.  Anti-Federalists and the Slave Trade Provision 
Anti-federalists in the North and the Upper South hammered home, 
again and again, the fundamental immorality of the clause.  On the last 
day of the Convention, Virginia’s George Mason, to no one’s surprise, 
declared he would not sign the Constitution, citing the slave trade 
provisions as one of his major objections.163  A man who owned many 
slaves, and who would never emancipate any of them,164 Mason 
nevertheless saw no reason to add more slaves to the nation, because 
“such importations render the United States weaker, more vulnerable, 
and less capable of defense.”165  He did not add, but could have if he had 
been totally honest, that the slave trade would also diminish the value of 
the many slaves he already owned.  Like other elite Virginians—George 
Washington being a major exception—Mason sold men “as you would 
do cattle at a market,” 166 to pay his debts and support his lifestyle. 
Many in the North, and some in the South, took a more principled 
stand against the Constitution because of the slave trade provision.  A 
New Yorker complained that the Constitution condoned “drenching the 
bowels of Africa in gore, for the sake of enslaving its free-born innocent 
inhabitants.”167  A correspondent in the Philadelphia Independent 
Gazetteer sarcastically noted that “[a]mong the blessings of the new-
proposed government” were the lack of a free press, the lack of a jury 
trial in civil cases, and “[a] Free importation of negroes for one and 
twenty years.”168  A Virginian thought the slave trade provision was an 
“excellent clause” for “an Algerian constitution: but not so well calculat-
ed (I hope) for the latitude of America.”169 
 
 163. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 637-40. 
 164. Wallenstein, supra note 73; John Michael Vlach, Material Culture in the United States, in 
MACMILLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD SLAVERY, supra note 3, at 566.    
 165. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 640. 
 166. Letter from George Washington to Alexander Spotswood (Nov. 23, 1794), in THE 
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745-1799, at 47 
(John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931-44) (explaining that he would sell slaves, like cattle).  On Washington 
and slaveholding see HENRY WIENCEK, AN IMPERFECT GOD:  GEORGE WASHINGTON, HIS SLAVES 
AND THE CREATION OF AMERICA 183-88 (2003); see also, FRITZ HIRSHFELD, GEORGE WASHINGTON 
AND SLAVERY:  A DOCUMENTARY PORTRAYAL 16-17 (1997); JOHN C. MILLER, WOLF BY THE EARS:  
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND SLAVERY 107 (1977).  
 167. Letters from a Countryman from Dutchess County (Jan. 22, 1788), in 5 THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST 62 (Herbert F. Storing ed., 1981). 
 168. Blessings of the New Government, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Oct. 6, 1787, in 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 157, at 354-56.  
 169. Essay by Republicus (Mar. 12, 1788), in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 
167, at 169. 
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A Connecticut anti-federalist made a more practical allusion to the 
problem of the African slave trade and the Algerian slavery.  At the 
time, New England sailors worried about being captured along the 
Barbary Coast and sold into slavery in North Africa.  He argued that the 
United States would  
have no right to complain of the Algerines, who live on the coast of 
Africa, if they enslave the Americans whom they find sailing in those 
seas, if we will send our vessels across the Atlantic, of set design, to 
purchase, kidnap, and decoy the inhabitants of the more southern states 
of the globe. 170 
It was more than just the slave trade that northern anti-federalists 
feared.  Three opponents of the Constitution in Massachusetts noted that 
the Constitution bound the states together as a “whole” and “the states” 
were “under obligation . . . reciprocally to aid each other in defense and 
support of every thing to which they are entitled thereby, right or 
wrong.”171  Thus, they might be called to suppress a slave revolt or in 
some other way defend the institution.  They could not predict how 
slavery might entangle them in the future, but they did know that “this 
lust for slavery, [was] portentous of much evil in America, for the cry of 
innocent blood, . . . hath undoubtedly reached to the Heavens, to which 
that cry is always directed, and will draw down upon them vengeance 
adequate to the enormity of the crime.”172 
B  Federalists and the Slave Trade Provision 
Northern supporters of the Constitution were at a rhetorical 
disadvantage in this debate, but they nevertheless had to engage the 
issue.  They developed three tactics.  The most honest response to the 
slave trade clause was to acknowledge that the Constitution protected the 
trade because it was necessary to secure the support of the Deep South, 
but that this clause was still an improvement over the current situation 
because under the Articles of Confederation, the national government 
had no power to regulate commerce.  
These supporters of the Constitution argued that under the new 
system of government it would be possible, in just twenty years, to end 
 
 170. Letter from Massachusetts, supra note 157, at 378-79.  
 171. See Arms, Milichi Maynard, and Samuel Field, Reasons for Dissent, in 4 THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST 263 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) supra note 167, at 263. 
 172. Id.  
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the trade.173  For example, Tench Coxe, a Philadelphia businessman who 
was also active in the Pennsylvania Abolition Society, argued that the 
clause was a “clear implication” that the trade was “inconsistent with the 
disposition and the duties of the people of America,” and that the 
“temporary reservation of any particular matter must ever be deemed as 
admission that it should be done away.”174  Coxe admitted that this 
clause was in the Constitution because in the Convention “regard was 
necessarily paid to the peculiar situation of our southern fellow-
citizens.”175  Similarly, an anonymous writer in New Jersey said that 
“the prospect of putting a stop to the abominable and accursed traffic, 
even at the period of twenty years, fills me with inexpressible joy.”176  
The wait was necessary because of the “critical situation of our Southern 
brethren,”177 but in the meantime this author noted the states were free to 
end the trade according to their own “discretion and humanity.”178 
Such arguments were entirely correct and doubtlessly provided 
cover for those who favored the Constitution but did not like the slave 
trade.  It is hard to imagine that they persuaded very many people not 
already inclined to support the Constitution, because the arguments did 
not answer the question of why the Convention so willingly suspended 
its power to regulate commerce only for the African slave trade.  
Northern opponents of the Constitution doubtless were underwhelmed 
by the argument that their interests had to be sacrificed to placate the 
“peculiar situation” of Southerners. 
A second argument was that the clause would require an end to the 
trade in twenty years, and thus this clause was actually antislavery.  Just 
after the Convention ended, the Pennsylvania Gazette made this claim, 
arguing that the Constitution “provides an effectual check to the African 
trade, in the course of one and twenty years.”179  Rather than bemoaning 
the law’s waiting period, the Gazette bragged that this clause was 
“honorable to America,” and made it “the first Christian power that has 
borne a testimony against a practice, that is alike disgraceful to religion, 
 
 173. 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 598 (1891). 
 174. Tench Coxe, An American Citizen IV: On the Federal Government, PA. GAZETTE, Oct. 
24, 1787, reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 157, at 431.  
 175. Id. 
 176. Reply to George Mason’s Objections to the Constitution, N.J. JOURNAL, Dec. 26 1787, 
reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 157, at 160. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. PA. GAZETTE, Sept. 26, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION, supra note 157, at 253-54. 
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and repugnant to the true interests and happiness of Society.”180  
Similarly, Benjamin Rush assured a private correspondent that in 1808 
“there will be an end of the African trade in America.”181   
This argument was of course, not correct.  The clause clearly did 
not require, or even guarantee, an end to the trade.  South Carolina’s 
delegation was counting on having enough political clout, in 1808, to 
prevent an end to the trade.  Optimistic supporters of the Constitution 
who opposed the trade hoped—correctly as it turned out—that in twenty 
years their side would have the votes to end the trade.  But, people like 
Rush were either themselves misled, or willing to mislead others, in 
asserting that the clause guaranteed an end to the trade in 1808. 
Ironically, the federalists who supported this interpretation of the 
clause may have been the first Americans to implement “popular 
constitutionalism” in the interpretation of the Constitution.  They helped 
turn their wishful thinking into a self-fulfilling prophecy by constantly 
asserting that the clause meant the trade would end in 1808.  By the time 
the Constitution was ratified, many voters—perhaps a majority of 
them—believed that the Constitution mandated an end to the trade, when 
it did not. 
There were, however, limits to how far popular constitutionalism 
might reshape the document.  The third variation of the northern 
federalists’ argument on the trade bears such limitations.  This was a 
thoroughly misleading, if not outright dishonest, claim that the slave 
trade clause would actually lead to an end to slavery itself.  However 
dishonest the argument was, it may have been politically shrewd.  Thus, 
James Wilson of Pennsylvania asserted at the Pennsylvania ratifying 
convention: “I consider this as laying the foundation for banishing 
slavery out of this country; and though the period is more distant than I 
could wish, yet it will produce the same kind, gradual change, which 
was pursued in Pennsylvania.”182  He also predicted that under the 
Constitution no new slave states would be admitted to the Union.183  A 
day later he declared that this clause was a “lovely feature in the 
Constitution” that “would diffuse a beauty over its whole 
countenance.”184  In these speeches, Wilson made the subtle shift from 
 
 180. Id. 
 181. Letter from Benjamin Rush to John Coakley Lettsom (Sept. 28, 1787), reprinted in 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 157, at 262. 
 182. James Wilson, Remarks at the Penn. Convention (Dec. 3 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 463 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 499. 
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the “trade” to slavery, and since most of his listeners were not as legally 
sophisticated as Wilson, he was able to fudge the issue.  Thus, Wilson 
told the Pennsylvania ratifying convention that after “the lapse of a few 
years . . . Congress will have power to exterminate slavery from within 
our borders.”185    
Since Wilson attended all the debates in the Convention over this 
clause, it is impossible to accept this statement as his understanding of 
the slave trade clause.  More likely, he simply made this argument to 
win support for the Constitution.  Supporters in other states made similar 
claims.  For example, in Massachusetts, Rev. Isaac Backus said with “a 
door open” to abolish the slave trade “we cannot say that slavery is 
struck with apoplexy, yet we may hope it will die with a 
consumption.”186   We cannot know if Backus honestly believed this was 
true, whether it was merely wishful thinking on his part, or whether he 
was intentionally trying to mislead voters. But clearly the Constitution 
did not empower the national government to end slavery, even after 
1808. 
Upper South supporters of the Constitution, like Edmund 
Randolph, also made the argument that a ban on the trade was 
impossible under the Articles, and thus the Constitution, even if 
imperfect, was still a good bargain.187  Deep South supporters of the 
Constitution, like Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, simply bragged that 
they had won a great victory—as indeed they had—in protecting the 
trade for at least twenty years.  In summing up the entire Constitution, 
General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, who had been one of the ablest 
defenders of slavery at the Convention, proudly told the South Carolina 
House of Representatives: “In short, considering all circumstances, we 
have made the best terms for the security of this species of property it 
was in our power to make.  We would have made better if we could; but 
on the whole, I do not think them bad.”188  David Ramsey, writing as 
Civis, reminded South Carolinians that a coalition of northern and upper 
south members of Congress could end the trade after 1808, but “it is 
probable that they will not” because “[t]he more rice we make, the more 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Isaac Backus, Remarks at Mass. Convention (Feb. 1788), in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1422 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 
2000). 
 187. ELLIOT, supra note 173, at 598-99. 
 188. ELLIOT, supra note 173, at 286. 
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business will be for their shipping: their interest will coincide with 
ours.”189 
VI.  REGULATING THE TRADE 
While Congress did not have the power to end the trade before 
1808, it did have the power to regulate the trade, and starting in 1794 
Congress did just that.190  In March, Congress prohibited the use of any 
U.S. port or shipyard for the purpose of fitting out or building any ship 
to be used in the trade.191  The law also prohibited ships sailing from 
U.S. ports from trafficking in slaves to foreign countries.192  Ships 
sailing from the United States to Africa, even if of foreign registry, were 
required to  
give bond with sufficient sureties, to the treasurer of the United States, 
that none of the natives of Africa, or any other foreign country or 
place, shall be taken on board . . . to be transported, or sold as slaves in 
any other foreign place, within nine months thereafter.193   
Penalties under the law included fines ranging from $2,000 for 
outfitting a ship to $200 for an individual working on such a ship.194  
The act provided that the actual ships involved in the trade could be 
confiscated.195  The law gave half of all fines to any informants, thus 
providing an incentive for ship captains and mariners to monitor the 
activities of anyone they suspected of being involved in the illegal 
trade.196 
In 1800, Congress amended the 1794 act by dramatically increasing 
fines for illegal American participation in the trade and giving 
informants a right to the entire value of any ship condemned under the 
law.197  In addition to not allowing American ships to participate in the 
trade, the new law prohibited any American from having any interest in 
a ship involved in the trade.198  Thus, Americans could no longer invest 
 
 189. David Ramsey, “To the Citizens of South Carolina”, Charleston Columbian Herald, Feb. 
4, 1788, in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 25 (John P. 
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986). 
 190. Act of March 22, 1794, ch.11, 1 Stat. 347 (1794). 
 191. Id.  
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 349.  
 194. Id.  
 195. Id.  
 196. Id.  
 197. Act of May 10, 1800, ch. 51, 2 Stat. 70 (1800). 
 198. Id.  
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in the trade, even if carried on legally by non-U.S. ships.199  If convicted 
of having an interest in the trade, an American was subject to a fine that 
was double the value of his investment in the vessel and double the 
value of any slaves in which he had an interest.200  The 1800 amendment 
explicitly prohibited any American citizen or resident alien from 
voluntarily serving “on board any foreign ship or vessel  . . . employed 
in the slave trade.”201  It no longer mattered if the ship was of U.S. 
register, or even if the ship left an American port.202  American sailors 
found on slavers (ships that transported slaves) were now subject to a 
$2,000 fine.203  The law authorized all “commissioned vessels of the 
United States, to seize and take any vessel employed” in the trade 
contrary to the law, with the crew receiving half the value of the ship 
when it was sold.204  This provided an enormous incentive for American 
ships to police the trade. 
In 1803, South Carolina reopened the trade.205  Earlier that year, 
probably in anticipation of South Carolina’s act, Congress passed a new 
law regulating the trade.206  This act created new fines for people who 
brought slaves into states that banned the importation of slaves.207  The 
law applied to any “negro, mulatto, or other person of color” imported 
from Africa or the Caribbean.208  The language was apparently used to 
prevent people from claiming that illegally imported Africans found on 
their ships were not slaves but servants or indentured servants.209 
The acts of 1794, 1800, and 1803 had been designed to limit 
American participation in the trade, but could not be used to stop the 
trade itself, because of Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution.  
Significantly, all of the laws passed before 1807 focused on ships, 
sailors, and investors.210  None of the laws had contained any provision 
regarding what should happen to slaves illegally imported into the 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id.  
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id.  
 205. Act of Dec 17, 1803, ch. 7, 1803 S.C. Acts 449; see also Shugerman, supra note 30, at 
264-66. 
 206. Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 10, 2 Stat. 205 (1803). 
 207. Id.  
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Act of March 22, 1794, ch.11, 1 Stat. 347 (1794); Act of May 10, 1800, ch. 51, 2 Stat. 70 
(1800); Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 10, 2 Stat. 205 (1803). 
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United States.211  Indeed, while the 1794 law provided for the sale of a 
ship and its “tackle, furniture, apparel and other appurtenances”212 of a 
slaver, it did not mention what should happen to any slaves or other 
cargo on the ship.213  Presumably, they too would be sold for the benefit 
of the United States, the informant, or any other claimant under the three 
laws.  
VII.  ABOLISHING THE TRADE 
In his annual message to Congress in December of 1806, Thomas 
Jefferson, who had long opposed the trade (but not slavery itself) 
reminded the nation that on January 1, 1808 the Constitutional 
suspension of Congressional power on this issue would finally expire.214  
He took a moment in his address to “congratulate” his  
fellow-citizens, on the approach of the period at which you may 
interpose your authority constitutionally to withdraw the citizens of the 
United States from all further participation in those violations of 
human rights which have been so long continued on the unoffending 
inhabitants of Africa, and which the morality, the reputation, and the 
best interests of our country have long been eager to proscribe.215   
He also noted that any law passed by Congress could not take effect 
until January 1, 1808, but nonetheless he urged Congress to act quickly 
“to prevent by timely notice expeditions which can not be completed 
before that day.”216  Congress readily complied with legislation to 
absolutely ban all importations of slaves after January 1, 1808.217  The 
1807 Act was a comprehensive attempt to close the African trade.  By 
passing the law in March, Congress gave all slave traders nine months to 
close down their operations in the United States.   
 
 211. See, e.g., Act of March 22, 1794, ch.11, 1 Stat. 347 (1794).   
 212. Id.  
 213. Id.  
 214. Thomas Jefferson, “Sixth Annual Message” to the United States Congress (Dec. 2, 1806), 
in A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 396 (1897), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29448. 
 215. Id.  
 216. Id.  
 217. An Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves, ch.22, 2 Stat. 426 (1807). 
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A.  The 1807 Act 
The ten sections of the 1807 Act were designed to eliminate all 
American participation in the trade.  Section 1 set the tone.218  After 
January 1, 1808 it would  
not be lawful to import or bring into the United States or the territories 
thereof from any foreign kingdom, place, or country, any negro, 
mulatto, or person of colour, with intent to hold, sell, or dispose of 
such [person] . . . as a slave, or to be held to service or labour.219   
The act provided an enormous penalty—up to $20,000—for anyone 
building a ship for the trade or fitting out an existing ship to be used in 
the trade.220   
Penalties for participating in the trade varied.  American citizens 
participating in the trade were subject to fines of up to $10,000 and jail 
terms of anywhere from five to ten years.221  Ships of any nation found 
in American ports or hovering off the American coast with slaves on 
them could be seized and forfeited, with the captain facing a $10,000 
fine and up to four years in prison.222  Any American who purchased an 
illegally imported slave would lose that slave and be fined $800 for 
every slave purchased.223  The law allowed the United States Navy to 
interdict ships involved in the illegal trade.224  The law required ships 
legally transporting slaves within the United States, from one Southern 
slave port to another, to register their cargo with port authorities before 
commencing their voyage.225  This section was designed to further 
prevent the illegal importation of slaves. 
The law certainly had impressive penalties for those who were 
convicted of violating it.  Fines under the statute were enormous, and the 
potential jail time was surely enough to discourage most slave 
smugglers.226  Moreover, for the Jefferson administration, which never 
much liked federal power, this Act constituted a huge grant of power to 
the national government.  Had Congress provided sufficient funding to 
enforce the law it would have surely closed the trade.  Funding the 
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suppression of the trade, would, however, be problematic until the Civil 
War.227   
There was one other problem with the 1808 law: the disposition of 
illegally imported slaves.  Logically, illegally imported slaves should 
have been either freed in the United States or sent back to Africa.  After 
all, one of the goals of the law was to end the importation of new slaves 
from Africa.  Given the views of President Jefferson, and many of the 
leaders of his party, neither option was possible.228   
President Jefferson was deeply hostile to the presence of free blacks 
in the United States.229  In a letter to Edward Coles, shortly after he left 
office, Jefferson referred to them as “pests” on society.230  Thus, his 
administration had no interest in freeing Africans who were illegally 
imported into the nation.  Nor was the deeply parsimonious Jefferson 
likely to support spending any money on returning the hapless Africans 
to their homeland.  They may have been sold into an immoral form of 
commerce and illegally brought to America as slaves, but at least from 
Jefferson’s perspective, that did not mean they should be free. 
So, what would the nation do with slaves illegally brought to its 
shores?  Reflecting Jefferson’s states’ rights ideology, his hatred of free 
blacks,231 and his refusal to spend money unless absolutely necessary, 
the law provided that any slaves illegally found in the United States 
would be treated according to the law of the state in which they were 
found—or brought to.232  In practice, this meant the unfortunate Africans 
who were illegally taken to the United States would not become free, but 
instead would become slaves in some southern state.   
Furthermore, the states where these illegally imported Africans 
were taken would actually profit from the illegal trade by selling the 
Africans.  This aspect of the law illustrates that the Jefferson 
administration was not antislavery and that it had no concerns about the 
immorality of actually enslaving freeborn Africans.  Such confiscations 
had the triple advantage of discouraging slave smugglers (who would 
lose all their cargo), enriching the Southern states which would profit 
from the sale of the illegally imported slaves, and also giving individual 
Southerners the opportunity to acquire new slaves.  
 
 227. DUBOIS, supra note 19, at 29, 170. 
 228. FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at ch. 5-7. 
 229. Id. at ch. 6-7; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Coles (Aug. 25, 1814), 
available at http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=307. 
 230. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Coles, supra note 229. 
 231. See generally FINKELMAN, supra note 44, ch. 6-7.  
 232. An Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves, ch.22, 2 Stat. 426 (1807). 
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Under the law, the United States would gain money from the sale of 
confiscated ships and the large fines imposed on anyone involved in the 
trade.233  People informing on those who violated the law, as well as the 
crews of naval ships that seized traders, would also share in the proceeds 
of the sale of ships that were seized.234  Southern states would have the 
proceeds from the sale of illegally imported slaves, and Southern slave-
owners would have access to a few more slaves.  Anticipating the logic 
of Chief Justice Taney’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857),235 
the Africans themselves would “have no rights,”236 and remain slaves.  
In sum, the act of 1807 provided heavy penalties—great disincentives—
for slave traders, but ignored the slaves themselves.  They were treated 
like merchandise to be transferred from the smuggler to some owner 
who could get a clear title to them.  The 1807 Act sought to end the 
trade, but did nothing to undermine the legitimacy of holding men and 
women in bondage.  In that respect it truly represented the ideology of 
the president who signed it into law. 
B.  The 1818 Act 
In 1818, Congress passed an elaborate new act,237 technically an 
amendment to the 1807 law, but really more like a new statute.238  The 
new law tinkered with the penalties for various offenses.239  For 
example, the maximum fine for fitting out a ship was reduced to $5,000 
and the jail time was reduced to no more than seven years.240  The 
reduction in penalties probably did not reflect any sense that the trade 
was less heinous.  Rather, the original penalties were probably out of 
line with standards for punishments at the time.   
The most significant change in the law was the standard by which 
courts would judge those charged under the 1818 act.  The new law 
shifted the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defendant.241  The 
new law required that defendant “prove that the negro or mulatto, or 
person of colour, which he or they shall be charged with having brought 
into the United States, or with purchasing . . . was brought into the 
 
 233. Id.  
 234. Id. 
 235. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 236. Id. at 404–05. 
 237. Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch.91, 3 Stat. 450 (1818). 
 238. Id.  
 239. Id.  
 240. Id. at 451. 
 241. Id.  
33
Finkelman: The American Suppression of the African Slave Trade
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
9-FINKELMAN.DOC 4/10/2009  9:03 AM 
464 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:431 
United States at least five years previous to the commencement of such 
prosecution.”242  This section of the law created a statute of limitation of 
five years on the law banning the trade, but it also made prosecutions 
easier within those five years.243  Under this law, anyone in possession 
of an African-born slave might have to prove how he came into 
possession of that slave, demonstrating the slave was in the United 
States at least five years before any prosecution.244  The “African-ness” 
of a slave would be prima facie evidence against an owner, to be 
rebutted only by contrary evidence the owner had to produce. 
C.  The 1819 Act 
In 1819 Congress passed yet another Act to regulate the slave 
trade.245  This law dramatically changed the regulation of the trade.  
First, it authorized the president to send “armed vessels of the United 
States, to be employed to cruise on any of the coasts of the United States 
. . . or the coast of Africa” to interdict slave traders.246  This was the 
beginning of what would eventually become known as the African 
Squadron, which patrolled the waters off the coast of Africa in an 
attempt to stop the slave trade at its source.247  The law also provided 
that illegally imported slaves be returned to Africa, rather than being 
sold in the United States.248  The Act authorized the president to appoint 
agents to receive rescued Africans and return them to the continent of 
their birth.249  Shortly after the adoption of this law, the United States 
would use Liberia as a destination for Africans taken off of intercepted 
ships.250  American ships could now seize slavers off the coast of Africa 
and immediately return the slaves to Africa.  The law provided an 
economic incentive for sailors on these ships.  The United States 
government promised a $25 bounty, to be shared by the crew of the 
interdicting vessel, for every slave rescued from traders.251  The Act also 
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 243. Id.  
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 245. Act of March 3, 1819, ch.101, 3 Stat. 532 (1819). 
 246. Id. at 532-33. 
 247. HOWARD JONES, TO THE WEBSTER-ASHBURTON TREATY:  A STUDY IN ANGLO-AMERICA 
RELATIONS, 1783-1843, at 144 (1977). 
 248. Act of March 3, 1819, ch.101, 3 Stat. 532, 533 (1819). 
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 250. Renee C. Redman, Liberia, in MACMILLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD SLAVERY, supra 
note 3, at 525-26; see generally TOM W. SHICK, BEHOLD THE PROMISED LAND: A HISTORY OF 
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 251. Act of March 3, 1819, ch.101, 3 Stat. 532, 533 (1819).  
34
Akron Law Review, Vol. 42 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss2/4
9-FINKELMAN.DOC 4/10/2009  9:03 AM 
2009] THE AMERICAN SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE 465 
provided a bounty of $50 per slave to any informant whose information 
led to the recovery of illegally imported slaves.252   
This Act changed the direction of the suppression of the trade.  The 
focus was now, in part, on the injustice of enslaving someone who 
deserved to be free.  Anyone illegally enslaved would thus be set free.  
The law now implicitly condemned American slavery itself.  If it was 
wrong—unlawful—to enslave an African after 1819, why, someone 
might ask, was it not wrong to enslave an African before 1808?  And if 
the original enslavement was morally wrong, then what was the basis of 
holding the descendants of that person in slavery?  Had such questions 
been raised, they might have led to a full-blown debate over slavery in 
the United States.  However, no one in Congress seems to have been 
concerned about the political and moral implications of this aspect of the 
law.   
The Act also took the United States out of the business of 
marketing slaves.  Before 1819, confiscated slaves were sold under the 
laws of the states where they ended up.253  Under the earlier laws, naval 
crews and informants were partially compensated from the sale of these 
slaves.254  Now, the taxpayers compensated naval crews and informants 
through bounties and the Africans went home.255  This was a dramatic 
change in American policy.  For the first time in the nation’s history, the 
United States was willing to spend money to help Africans gain their 
liberty. 
D.  The Act of 1820 
The final substantive statute to regulate the trade was passed in 
1820, with the unlikely title “An Act to continue in force ‘An act to 
protect the commerce of the United States, and to punish the crime of 
piracy,’ and also to make further provisions for punishing the crime of 
piracy.”256  The key elements of the law were two sections declaring that 
any American citizen engaging in the African slave trade “shall be 
adjudged a pirate; and on conviction thereof before the circuit court of 
the United States for the district wherein he shall be brought or found, 
shall suffer death.”257  The same language was applied to non-Americans 
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found on board slavers owned or commissioned by Americans.258  The 
statute provided that this penalty was to be in force for only two years, 
but on January 3, 1823 Congress made it a permanent statute.259  This 
was a dramatic and important change in U.S. policy. 
After 1820, participation in the African Slave Trade was to be 
considered the most heinous crime on the high seas—piracy—to be 
punished by death.260  Never before had the United States taken such a 
stand against any aspect of slavery.  Enforcement would be a challenge.  
The Atlantic Ocean was vast and the African Squadron was always too 
small.261  Slavers captured in or near southern ports would be tried by 
jurors sympathetic to slavery.  These jurors might also not always be 
hostile to the illegal import of slaves.262  No slaver would actually be 
executed until the Lincoln Administration actually enforced the law to 
its fullest.263  But the 1820 law was somewhat effective in curbing the 
trade.  Few sailors were willing to risk their lives for the relatively paltry 
earnings on board a slaver.  The high cost of failure—confiscation of a 
ship, large fines, jail time for the owner, and possibly execution for the 
captain and crew—surely discouraged most would-be traders.264  
Incentives for informing on Americans who bought illegally imported 
slaves were high.265  At $50.00 a slave, an informant could make $5,000 
for tipping off authorities that a mere one hundred Africans had been 
secretly and illegally landed.266  At $25.00 a slave, the crews of the 
African Squadron had a strong incentive for acting “above and beyond” 
the call of duty.267  Even in cases where the slavers were not executed, 
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ships were seized and forfeited, making the business very expensive and 
not very profitable.268 
To be sure, some slaves were smuggled into the United States after 
1820.  But the risks were high and the numbers were relatively few.269  
In an eight-year period from 1800 until December 31, 1807, about 
40,000 Africans were forcibly brought into the country.270  This was the 
last large importation of slaves into the United States.  Between 1808, 
when the slave trade ban went into effect, and 1820, when slave trading 
was declared piracy, it is possible that as many as 10,000 slaves were 
smuggled into the United States.271  After 1820 it is unlikely that more 
than 2,500 Africans were illegally brought to the United States, and it 
may have been less than that.272  American-born slaves would be 
shipped to the Deep South and the Southwest in large numbers, as the 
internal slave trade replaced the African trade and hundreds of thousands 
of African-American slaves were uprooted and moved further south and 
further west.273  The cost of ending that domestic trade–the American 
Civil War–would be infinitely higher than ending the African trade.274  
But, the moral issue was set in 1819 and 1820 when the United States 
finally stated, in unequivocal terms that enslaving people was a “wrong” 
and those who engaged in the African trade were no better than common 
pirates.275  And, like common pirates, they deserved to be hanged. 
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